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The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other
Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform
Danielle Keats Citron† and Mary Anne Franks††

I.

INTRODUCTION

A robust public debate is currently underway about the responsibility of online platforms for harmful content. We have long called for
this discussion,1 but only recently has it been seriously taken up by legislators and the public. The debate begins with a basic question: should
platforms be responsible for user-generated content?2 If so, under what
circumstances? What exactly would such responsibility look like?
At the heart of this debate is Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 19963—a provision originally designed to encourage tech
companies to clean up “offensive” online content. Section 230 was
adopted at the dawn of the commercial internet. According to the standard narrative of its passage, federal lawmakers wanted the internet to
be open and free, but they also realized that such openness risked
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Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Vice President, Cyber
Civil Rights Initiative, 2019 MacArthur Fellow.
††
Professor of Law & Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law, President, Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. Deep thanks to the editors of the University of Chicago Legal
Forum for including us in the symposium. Olivier Sylvain, Spencer Overton, Genevieve Lakier,
Brian Leiter, and symposium participants provided helpful comments. It was a particular pleasure
to engage with co-panelists Amy Adler, Leslie Kendrick, and Fred Schauer. Matthew Atha provided superb research assistance. We are grateful to Dan Simon and Rebecca Roman for their
terrific suggestions and editing.
1
See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89
B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012).
2
That is, beyond the select avenues that currently are not shielded from liability, such as
intellectual property, federal criminal law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the
knowing facilitation of sex trafficking.
3
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). According to Blake Reid, the most accurate citation for the law is
“Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934”; we have retained “Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act” because of its common usage. Blake Reid, Section 230 of… What?,
BLAKE.E.REID (Sept. 4, 2020), https://blakereid.org/section-230-of-what/ [https://perma.cc/DUL6DKK2].
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encouraging noxious activity.4 In their estimation, tech companies were
essential partners in any effort to “clean up the Internet.”5
A troubling 1995 judicial decision, however, imperiled the promise
of self-regulation. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy, a New York
state court ruled that any attempt to moderate content turned platforms into publishers and thus increased their risk of liability.6 Lawmakers devised Section 230 as a direct repudiation of that ruling. The
idea was to incentivize, rather than penalize, private efforts to filter,
block, or otherwise address noxious activity.7 Section 230 provided that
incentive, securing a shield from liability for “Good Samaritans” that
under- or over-filtered “offensive” content.8
Over the past two (plus) decades, Section 230 has helped secure a
variety of opportunities for online engagement, but individuals and society have not been the clear winners. Regrettably, state and lower federal courts have extended Section 230’s legal shield far beyond what the
law’s words, context, and purpose support. 9 Platforms have been
shielded from liability even when they encourage illegal action, deliberately keep up manifestly harmful content, or take a cut of users’ illegal
activities.10
To many of its supporters, however, Section 230 is an article of
faith. Section 230 has been hailed as “the most important law protecting
internet speech” and characterized as the essential building block of
online innovation.11 For years, to question Section 230’s value proposition was viewed as sheer folly and, for many, heretical.
No longer. Today, politicians across the ideological spectrum are
raising concerns about the leeway provided to content platforms under
Section 230. 12 Conservatives claim that Section 230 gives tech

4

See generally Hearing on Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers Before the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Danielle Keats Citron, Professor, B.U. Law Sch.) (available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20191016/110075/
HHRG-116-IF16-Wstate-CitronD-20191016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F2V-BHKL]).
5
Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google is About to Change,
NPR (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/sectio
n-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change [https://perma.cc/FG5N-MJ5T].
6
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995); see also JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019)
(offering an excellent history of Section 230 and the cases leading to its passage).
7
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 170–73.
8
Citron & Wittes, supra note 1, at 404–06.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/W75F-6MRN].
12
See Danielle Keats Citron & Quinta Jurecic, Platform Justice: Content Moderation at an
Inflection Point at 1, 4 (Hoover Inst., Aeigis Series Paper No. 1811, 2018), https://www.hoo
ver.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/citron-jurecic_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XZY-9H
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companies a license to silence speech based on viewpoint. 13 Liberals
criticize Section 230 for giving platforms the freedom to profit from
harmful speech and conduct.14
Although their assessments of the problem differ, lawmakers agree
that Section 230 needs fixing. As a testament to the shift in attitudes,
the House Energy and Commerce Committee held a hearing on October
16, 2019 on how to make the internet “healthier” for consumers, bringing together academics (including one of us, Citron), advocates, and social media companies to discuss whether and how to amend Section
230.15 The Department of Justice held an event devoted to Section 230
reform (at which one of us, Franks, participated) on February 19,
2020.16
In a few short years, Section 230 reform efforts have evolved from
academic fantasy to legislative reality.17 One might think that we, as
critics of the Section 230 status quo, would cheer this moment. But we
approach this opportunity with caution. Congress cannot fix what it
does not understand. Sensible policymaking depends on a clear-eyed
view of the interests at stake. As advisers to federal lawmakers on both
sides of the aisle, we can attest to the need to dispel misunderstandings
in order to clear the ground for meaningful policy discussions.
The public discourse around Section 230 is riddled with misconceptions.18 As an initial matter, many people who opine about the law are
BF].
13

See Sen. Cruz: Latest Twitter Bias Underscores Need for Big Tech Transparency, U.S.
SENATOR FOR TEX. TED CRUZ (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=
4630 [https://perma.cc/23UU-SWF7].
14
Marguerite Reardon, Democrats and Republicans Agree that Section 230 is Flawed, CNET
(June 21, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/democrats-and-republicans-agree-that-section-230-isflawed/ [https://perma.cc/6VJG-DW5W].
15
See Hearing on “Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers,” HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY & COM., https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hearing-on-fo
stering-a-healthier-internet-to-protect-consumers [https://perma.cc/4YK2-595J]. Witnesses also
included computer scientist Hany Farid of the University of California at Berkeley, Gretchen Petersen of the Alliance to Counter Crime Online, Corynne McSherry of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Steve Huffman of Reddit, and Katie Oyama of Google. Id. At that hearing, one of us (Citron)
took the opportunity to combat myths around Section 230 and offer sensible reform possibilities,
which we explore in Part III.
16
See Section 230 Workshop—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability?, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/section-230-workshop-nurturing
-innovation-or-fostering-unaccountability [https://perma.cc/PQV2-MZGZ]. The roundtable raised
issues explored here as well as questions about encryption, which we do not address here.
17
There are several House and Senate proposals to amend or remove Section 230’s legal
shield.
18
See Adi Robertson, Why The Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How People are Still
Getting it Wrong, VERGE (June 21, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/21/18700605/section230-internet-law-twenty-six-words-that-created-the-internet-jeff-kosseff-interview
[https://perma.cc/6ALQ-XN43]; see also Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230—and the Internet
as We Know It, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/D9XG-BYB5].
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unfamiliar with its history, text, and application. This lack of
knowledge impairs thoughtful evaluation of the law’s goals and how
well they have been achieved. Accordingly, Part I of this Article sets the
stage with a description of Section 230—its legislative history and purpose, its interpretation in the courts, and the problems that current judicial interpretation raises. A second, and related, major source of misunderstanding is the conflation of Section 230 and the First
Amendment. Part II of this Article details how this conflation distorts
discussion in three ways: it assumes all internet activity is protected
speech, it treats private actors as though they were government actors,
and it presumes that regulation will inevitably result in less speech.
These distortions must be addressed to pave the way for effective policy
reform. This is the subject of Part III, which offers potential solutions
to help Section 230 achieve its legitimate goals.
II.

SECTION 230: A COMPLEX HISTORY

Tech policy reform is often a difficult endeavor. Sound tech policy
reform depends upon a clear understanding of the technologies and the
varied interests at stake. As recent hearings on Capitol Hill have
shown, lawmakers often struggle to effectively address fast-moving
technological developments.19 The slowness of the lawmaking process
further complicates matters.20 Lawmakers may be tempted to throw up
their hands in the face of technological change that is likely to outpace
their efforts.
19

See Dylan Byers, Senate Fails its Zuckerberg Test, CNN BUS. (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/10/technology/senate-mark-zuckerberg-testimony/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Y2M6-3RMG]. The 2018 congressional hearings on the Cambridge Analytica
data leak poignantly illustrate the point. In questioning Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg for several days during his testimony before the House and the Senate, some lawmakers made clear that
they had never used the social network and had little understanding of online advertising, which
is the dominant tech companies’ business model. To take one example of many, Senator Orrin
Hatch asked Zuckerberg how his company made money since it does not charge users for its services. See Hearing on Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data Before the
S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018); see also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER
479–88 (2019). As is clear from committee hearings and our work, however, there are lawmakers
and staff devoted to tackling tech policy, including Senator (now Vice President–Elect) Kamala
Harris, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Senator Mark Warner, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, and
Congresswoman Kathleen Clark, who exhibit more familiarity and knowledge with tech companies
and their practices.
20
According to conventional wisdom, it can take years for bills to become law. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the process is speedier when lawmakers’ self-interests hang in the balance. The Video
Privacy Protection Act’s rapid-fire passage is an obvious case in point. That law passed in less than
a year’s time after the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court revealed that
journalists could easily obtain people’s video rental records. Video Privacy Protection Act,
WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_Privacy_Protection_Act [https://pe
rma.cc/8WJD-JB2P]. Lawmakers fearing that their video rental records would be released to the
public passed VPPA in short order. Id.
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This Part highlights the developments that bring us to this moment
of reform. Section 230 was devised to incentivize responsible content
moderation practices.21 And yet its drafting fell short of that goal by
failing to explicitly condition the legal shield on responsible practices.
This has led to an overbroad reading of Section 230, with significant
costs to individuals and society.
A. Reviewing the History Behind Section 230
In 1996, Congress faced a challenge. Lawmakers wanted the internet to be open and free, but they also knew that openness risked the
posting of illegal and “offensive” material. 22 They knew that federal
agencies could not deal with all “noxious material” on their own and
that they needed tech companies to help moderate content. Congress
devised an incentive: a shield from liability for “Good Samaritans” that
blocked or filtered too much or too little speech as part of their efforts
to “clean up the Internet.”23
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was introduced to make the internet safer for
children and to address concerns about pornography.24 Besides proposing criminal penalties for the distribution of sexually explicit material
online, members of Congress underscored the need for private sector
help in reducing the volume of “offensive” material online.25 Then-Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden offered an amendment to
the CDA entitled “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material.” 26 The Cox-Wyden Amendment, codified as Section
230, provided immunity from liability for “Good Samaritan” online service providers that over- or under-filtered objectionable content.27
Section 230(c), entitled “Good Samaritan blocking and filtering of
offensive content,” has two key provisions. Section 230(c)(1) specifies
that providers or users of interactive computer services will not be
treated as publishers or speakers of user-generated content.28 Section
230(c)(2) says that online service providers will not be held liable for

21

Or at least this is the most generous reading of its history. See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE
CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (showing that one of us (Franks) is somewhat more skeptical
about the narrative that Section 230’s flaws were not evident at its inception).
22
Selyukh, supra note 5.
23
See Citron & Wittes, supra note 1, at 406.
24
See id. at 418.
25
KOSSEFF, supra note 6, at 71–74; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1.
26
Id. at 403.
27
Id. at 408.
28
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
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good-faith filtering or blocking of user-generated content.29 Section 230
also carves out limitations for its immunity provisions: its protections
do not apply to violations of federal criminal law, intellectual property
law, the Electronic Privacy Communications Act, and, as of 2018, the
knowing facilitation of sex trafficking.30
In 1996, lawmakers could hardly have imagined the role that the
internet would play in modern life. Yet Section 230’s authors were prescient in many ways. In their view, “if this amazing new thing—the Internet—[was] going to blossom,” companies should not be “punished for
trying to keep things clean.”31 Cox recently explained that, “the original
purpose of [Section 230] was to help clean up the Internet, not to facilitate people doing bad things on the Internet.”32 The key to Section 230,
Wyden agreed, was “making sure that companies in return for that protection—that they wouldn’t be sued indiscriminately—were being responsible in terms of policing their platforms.”33
B. Explaining the Judiciary’s Interpretation of Section 230
The judiciary’s interpretation of Section 230 has not squared with
this vision. Rather than treating Section 230 a legal shield for responsible moderation efforts, courts have stretched it far beyond what its
words, context, and purpose support.34 Section 230 has been read to immunize from liability platforms that:
knew about users’ illegal activity, deliberately refused to remove it, and ensured that those users could not be identified;35
solicited users to engage in tortious and illegal activity;36 and

29

Id. § 230(c)(2).
Id. § 230(e).
31
See Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challe
nge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/ARY6-KTE8].
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
See Citron & Wittes, supra note 1, at 406–10; Mary Anne Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L. J. 10 (2020); see also Olivier Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. FORUM 252 (2020) (explaining that “common law has not had a meaningful hand in shaping intermediaries’ moderation of user-generated content because courts, citing
Section 230, have foresworn the law’s application).
35
Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, supra note 34, at 17–22.
36
See id.
30
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designed their sites to enhance the visibility of illegal activity
while ensuring that the perpetrators could not be identified and
caught.37
Courts have attributed this broad-sweeping approach to the fact that
“First Amendment values [drove] the CDA.”38 For support, courts have
pointed to Section 230’s “Findings” and “Policy” sections, which highlight the importance of the “vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists” for the internet and the internet’s role in facilitating
“myriad avenues for intellectual activity” and the “diversity of political
discourse.” 39 But as one of us (Franks) has underscored, Congress’s
stated goals also included:
the development of technologies that “maximize user control
over what information is received” by Internet users, as well as
the “vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking and harassment by
means of the computer.” In other words, the law [was] intended
to promote the values of privacy, security and liberty alongside
the values of open discourse.40
Section 230’s liability shield has been extended to activity that has little
or nothing to do with free speech, such as the sale of dangerous products. 41 Consider Armslist.com, a self-described “firearms marketplace.”42 Armslist helps match unlicensed gun sellers with buyers who
cannot pass background checks, buyers like domestic abuser Radcliffe
Haughton.43 Haughton’s estranged wife, Zina, had obtained a restraining order against him that banned him from legally purchasing a firearm,44 but Haughton used Armslist.com to easily find a gun seller that
did not require a background check.45 On October 21, 2012, he used the
gun he purchased on the site to murder Zina and two of her co37

See Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, supra note 31. See
generally Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2017).
38
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 622 (2017).
39
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009).
40
See Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/section-230-the-lawl
ess-internet_b_4455090 [https://perma.cc/R6SF-X4WQ].
41
See, e.g., Hinton v. Amazon.com.DEDC, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687–90 (S.D. Miss. 2014);
see also Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, supra note 34, at 14.
42
See ARMSLIST FIREARM MARKETPLACE, https://www.armslist.com/ [https://perma.cc/VX34GVB4].
43
See id.
44
See id.
45
See id.
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workers.46 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found Armslist to be immune
from liability under Section 230(c)(1), despite profiting from the illegal
firearm sale that led to multiple murders.47
Extending Section 230’s immunity shield to platforms like Armslist.com, which deliberately facilitate and earn money from unlawful
activity, directly contradicts the stated goals of the CDA. Armslist.com
can hardly be said to “provide ‘educational and informational resources’
or contribute to ‘the diversity of political discourse.’”48 Invoking Section
230 to immunize from liability enterprises that have nothing to do with
moderating online speech, such as marketplaces that connect sellers of
deadly weapons with prohibited buyers for a cut of the profits, is unjustifiable.
C. Evaluating the Status Quo
The overbroad interpretation of Section 230 means that platforms
have scant legal incentive to combat online abuse. Rebecca Tushnet put
it well a decade ago: Section 230 ensures that platforms enjoy “power
without responsibility.”49
Market forces alone are unlikely to encourage responsible content
moderation. Platforms make their money through online advertising
generated by users liking, clicking, and sharing content.50 Allowing attention-grabbing abuse to remain online often accords with platforms’
rational self-interest.51 Platforms “produce nothing and sell nothing except advertisements and information about users, and conflict among
those users may be good for business.”52 On Twitter, for example, ads
can be directed at users interested in the words “white supremacist”
and “anti-gay.”53 If a company’s analytics suggest that people pay more
46

See id.
See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019). The nonprofit organization the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, of which one of us (Franks) is the President
and one of us (Citron) is the Vice President, filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioner’s
request for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. See Brief for the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative
and Legal Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 140
S. Ct. 562 (2019) (No. 19-153).
48
See Brief for the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and Legal Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 16, Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019) (No. 19-153).
49
Rebecca Tushnet, Power without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1002 (2008).
50
See Mary Anne Franks, Justice Beyond Dispute, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1374, 1386 (2018) (reviewing ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET OF DISPUTES (2017)).
51
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As It Is
(and As It Should Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (2020).
52
See id.
53
Kim Lyons, Twitter allowed ad targeting based on ‘neo-Nazi’ keyword, VERGE (Jan. 16,
2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/16/21069142/twitter-neo-nazi-keywords-ad-targeting-bbc
47
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attention to content that makes them sad or angry, then the company
will highlight such content.54 Research shows that people are more attracted to negative and novel information.55 Thus, keeping up destructive content may make the most sense for a company’s bottom line.
As Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra warned in his powerful dissent from the agency’s 2019 settlement with Facebook, the behavioral advertising business model is the “root cause of [social media
companies’] widespread and systemic problems.” 56 Online behavioral
advertising generates profits by “turning users into products, their activity into assets,” and their platforms into “weapons of mass manipulation.”57 Tech companies “have few incentives to stop [online abuse],
and in some cases are incentivized to ignore or aggravate [it].”58
To be sure, the dominant tech companies have moderated certain
content by filtering or blocking it.59 What often motivates these efforts
is pressure from the European Commission to remove hate speech and
terrorist activity.60 The same companies have banned certain forms of
online abuse, such as nonconsensual pornography61 and threats, in response to lobbying from users, advocacy groups, and advertisers.62 They
have expended resources to stem abuse when it has threatened their
bottom line.63
Yet the online advertising business model continues to incentivize
revenue-generating content that causes significant harm to the most
vulnerable among us. Online abuse generates traffic, clicks, and shares

-policy-violation [https://perma.cc/RQ9G-S5AT].
54
See Dissenting Statement of Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra, In re Facebook,
Inc., Commission File No. 1823109, at 2 (July 24, 2019).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See Franks, Justice Beyond Dispute, supra note 50, at 1386.
59
See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2018); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for the Information Age, 91 B.U. L REV.
1435, 1468–71 (2011).
60
See id. at 1038–39.
61
See Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 1252, 1312 (2017).
62
Id. at 1037.
63
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 229 (discussing how Facebook
changed its position on pro-rape pages after fifteen companies threatened to pull their ads); see
also Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, supra note 61, at 1312.
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because it is salacious and negative.64 Deepfake pornography sites65 as
well as revenge porn and gossip sites66 thrive thanks to advertising revenue.
Without question, Section 230 has been valuable to innovation and
expression.67 It has enabled vast and sundry businesses. It has led to
the rise of social media companies that many people find valuable, such
as Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit.
At the same time, Section 230 has subsidized platforms whose business is online abuse and the platforms who benefit from ignoring abuse.
It is a classic “moral hazard,” ensuring that tech companies never have
to absorb the costs of their behavior.68 It takes away the leverage that
victims might have had to get harmful content taken down.
This laissez-faire approach has been costly to individuals, groups,
and society. As more than ten years of research have shown, cyber mobs
and individual harassers inflict serious and widespread injury. 69 According to a 2017 Pew Research Center study, one in five U.S. adults
have experienced online harassment that includes stalking, threats of
violence, or cyber sexual harassment.70 Women — particularly women of

64

See Deeptrace Labs, The State of Deepfakes: Landscape, Threats, and Impact,
DEEPTRACE.COM (Sept. 2019), https://storage.googleapis.com/deeptrace-public/Deeptrace-the-Stat
e-of-Deepfakes-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2ML-2G2Y] (noting that eight of the top ten pornography websites host deepfake pornography, and there are nine deepfake pornography websites hosting 13,254 fake porn videos (mostly featuring female celebrities without their consent). These sites
generate income from advertising. Indeed, as the first comprehensive study of deepfake video and
audio explains, “deepfake pornography represents a growing business opportunity, with all of
these websites featuring some form of advertising”).
65
See id.
66
Eugene Volokh, TheDirty.com not liable for defamatory posts on the site, WASH. POST, (June
16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/16/thedirty-comnot-liable-for-defamatory-posts-on-the-site/ [https://perma.cc/5FBB-2B59].
67
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 171.
68
See Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazard on Stilts: ‘Zeran’s’ Legacy, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/moral-hazard-on-stilts-zerans-lega
cy/ [https://perma.cc/74DL-B7BK].
69
See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1. See Maeve Duggan,
Online Harassment 2017 Study, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/inte
rnet/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ [https://perma.cc/7H6B-VAP2] (noting that the 2017
Pew study found that one in four Black individuals say they have been subject to online harassment due to their race; one in ten Hispanic individuals have said the same. For white individuals,
the share is far lower: just three percent. Women are twice as likely as men to say they have been
targeted online due to their gender (11 percent versus 5 percent)); see also Data & Society, Online
Harassment, Digital Abuse, and Cyberstalking in America, CTR. FOR INNOVATIVE PUB. HEALTH
RES., (Nov. 21, 2016), https://innovativepublichealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2_Online-Harassment-Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5M8-CARR] (showing that other studies have made
clear that LGBTQ individuals are particularly vulnerable to online harassment, and nonconsensual pornography).
70
See Duggan, supra note 69.
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color and bisexual women — and other sexual minorities are targeted
most frequently.71
Victims of online abuse do not feel safe on or offline.72 They experience anxiety and severe emotional distress. They suffer damage to their
reputations and intimate relationships as well as their employment and
educational opportunities.73 Some victims are forced to relocate, change
jobs, or even change their names.74 Because the abuse so often appears
in internet searches of their names, victims have difficulty finding employment or keeping their jobs.75
Failing to address online abuse does not just inflict economic, physical, and psychological harms on victims — it also jeopardizes their right
to free speech. Online abuse silences victims.76 Targeted individuals often shut down social media profiles and e-mail accounts and withdraw
from public discourse. 77 Those with political ambitions are deterred
from running for office.78 Journalists refrain from reporting on controversial topics.79 Sextortion victims are coerced into silence with threats
of violence, insulating perpetrators from accountability.80
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CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 13–14.
Id.
73
See FRANKS, CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 197.
74
Id.
75
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 13–14.
76
See Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 125–26 (2016); see also Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 3
(2017). See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 192–95; Danielle
Keats Citron, Civil Rights In Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET (Saul Levmore &
Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2010); Citron & Richards, infra note 133, at 1365 (“[N]ot everyone can
freely engage online. This is especially true for women, minorities, and political dissenters who are
more often the targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers.”); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary
Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 385 (2014); Citron, Cyber
Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 67, 104–05; FRANKS, CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at
197.
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See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1.
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Katie Hill, for instance, resigned from Congress after her estranged husband disclosed intimate photos of her and another woman without consent. See generally Rebecca Green, Candidate
Privacy, 95 WASH. L. REV. 205 (2020).
79
See, e.g., Michelle Ferrier, Attacks and Harassment: The Impact on Female Journalists and
Their Reporting, INT’L WOMEN’S MEDIA FOUND. 7 (2018), https://www.iwmf.org/wp-content/uploa
ds/2018/09/Attacks-and-Harassment.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B79-FJF80; see also Women Journalists and the Double Blind: Choosing silence over being silenced, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMC’N
(2018) https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Gendering_Self-Censorship_Women_and_the_Double_Bind.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5V5-538U] (providing statistics on self-censorship by female journalists in Pakistan); INTERNET HEALTH REPORT 2019, MOZILLA FOUND. 64 (2019) https://www.
transcript-verlag.de/media/pdf/1a/ce/ac/oa9783839449462.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3M2G-GHVF]
(“Online abusers threaten and intimidate in an effort to silence the voices of especially women,
nonbinary people, and people of color.”).
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See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1916 (2019).
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An overly capacious view of Section 230 has undermined equal opportunity in employment, politics, journalism, education, cultural influence, and free speech.81 The benefits of Section 230 immunity surely
could have been secured at a lesser price.82
III.

DEBUNKING THE MYTHS ABOUT SECTION 230

After writing about overbroad interpretations of Section 230 for
more than a decade, we have eagerly anticipated the moment when federal lawmakers would begin listening to concerns about Section 230.
Finally, lawmakers are questioning the received wisdom that any tinkering with Section 230 would lead to a profoundly worse society. Yet we
approach this moment with a healthy dose of skepticism. Nothing is
gained if Section 230 is changed to indulge bad faith claims, address
fictitious concerns, or disincentivize content moderation. We have been
down this road before, and it is not pretty.83 Yes, Section 230 is in need
of reform, but it must be the right kind of reform.
Our reservations stem from misconceptions riddling the debate.
Those now advocating for repealing or amending Section 230 often dramatically claim that broad platform immunity betrays free speech guarantees by sanctioning the censorship of political views. By contrast, Section 230 absolutists oppose any effort to amend Section 230 on the
grounds that broad platform immunity is indispensable to free speech
guarantees. Both sides tend to conflate the First Amendment and Section 230, though for very different ends. This conflation reflects and reinforces three major misconceptions. One is the presumption that all
internet activity is speech. The second is the treatment of private actors
as if they were government actors. The third is the assumption that any
regulation of online conduct will inevitably result in less speech. This
Part identifies and debunks these prevailing myths.
A. The Internet as a Speech Machine
Both detractors and supporters agree that Section 230 provides
online intermediaries broad immunity from liability for third-party content. The real point of contention between the two groups is whether
this broad immunity is a good or a bad thing. While critics of Section
230 point to the extensive range of harmful activity that the law’s deregulatory stance effectively allows to flourish, Section 230 defenders
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See generally FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21.
Citron & Wittes, supra note 1.
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FOSTA-SESTA stands as a case in point. One of us (Citron) worked closely with federal
lawmakers on the FOSTA-SESTA bills only to be sorely disappointed with the results. See Part IV.
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argue that the law’s laissez-faire nature is vital to ensuring a robust
online marketplace of ideas.
Section 230 enthusiast Elizabeth Nolan Brown argues that “Section 230 is the Internet’s First Amendment.”84 David Williams, president of the Taxpayers Protection Alliance, similarly contends that, “The
internet flourishes when social media platforms allow for discourse and
debate without fear of a tidal wave of liability. Ending Section 230
would shutter this marketplace of ideas at tremendous cost.”85 Professor Eric Goldman claims that Section 230 is “even better than the First
Amendment.”86
This view of Section 230 presumes that the internet is primarily, if
not exclusively, a medium of speech. The text of Section 230 reinforces
this characterization through the use of the terms “publish,” “publishers,” “speech,” and “speakers” in 230(c), as well as the finding that the
“Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”87
But the presumption that the internet is primarily a medium of
speech should be interrogated.88 When Section 230 was passed, it may
have made sense to think of the internet as a speech machine. In 1996,
the Internet was text-based and predominantly noncommercial.89 Only
20 million American adults had internet access, and these users spent
less than half an hour a month online.
But by 2019, 293 million Americans were using the internet,90 and
they were using it not only to communicate, but also to buy and sell
merchandise, find dates, make restaurant reservations, watch television, read books, stream music, and look for jobs.91 As Nolan Brown describes it:
84

See Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First Amendment. Now Both Republicans and Democrats Want to Take it Away., REASON (July 29, 2019), https://reason.com/
2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-now-both-republicans-and-democratswant-to-take-it-away/ [https://perma.cc/EW8Z-GVF7].
85
See Makena Kelly, Conservative Groups Push Congress Not to Meddle with Internet Law,
VERGE (July 10, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/10/20688778/congress-section-230-conse
rvative-internet-law-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/W5ZA-FH29].
86
Eric Goldman Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
REFLECTIONS 33, 33 (2019).
87
47 U.S.C § 230(a)(3).
88
See Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, supra note 34.
89
KOSSEFF, supra note 6, at 59–61; Citron & Richards, infra note 133; Sylvain, supra note 37,
at 19 (“back then think electronic bulletin boards, online chatrooms, and newsgroups.”).
90
See J. Clement, Internet Usage in the United States - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Aug. 20,
2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2237/internet-usage-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc
/U8U7-BEVR].
91
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 191–92; J. Clement, Most Popular Online Activities of Adult Internet Users in the United States as of November 2017, STATISTA
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the entire suite of products we think of as the internet—search
engines, social media, online publications with comments sections, Wikis, private message boards, matchmaking apps, job
search sites, consumer review tools, digital marketplaces,
Airbnb, cloud storage companies, podcast distributors, app
stores, GIF clearinghouses, crowdsourced funding platforms,
chat tools, email newsletters, online classifieds, video sharing
venues, and the vast majority of what makes up our day-to-day
digital experience—have benefited from the protections offered
by Section 230.92
Many of these “products” have very little to do with speech and, indeed,
many of their offline cognates would not be considered speech for First
Amendment purposes.
This is not the same thing as saying that the First Amendment
does not protect all speech, although this is also true. The point here is
that much human activity does not implicate the First Amendment at
all. As Frederick Schauer observes, “Like any other rule, the First
Amendment does not regulate the full range of human behavior.”93
The acts, behaviors, and restrictions not encompassed by the
First Amendment at all — the events that remain wholly untouched by the First Amendment--are the ones that are simply
not covered by the First Amendment. It is not that the speech is
not protected. Rather, the entire event — an event that often involves “speech” in the ordinary language sense of the word —
does not present a First Amendment issue at all, and the government’s action is consequently measured against no First
Amendment standard whatsoever. The First Amendment just
does not show up.94
Section 230 absolutists are not wrong to emphasize the vast array of
activities now conducted online; they are wrong to presume that the
First Amendment shows up for all of them.
First Amendment doctrine draws a line, contested though it might
be, not only between protected and unprotected speech but between
speech and conduct. As one of us (Citron) has written, “[a]dvances in
law and technology . . . complicate this distinction as they make more
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/183910/internet-activities-of-us-users/ [https://
perma.cc/QA5D-6KBB].
92
Nolan Brown, supra note 84.
93
See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1613, 1617–18 (2015).
94
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004).
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actions achievable through ‘mere’ words.”95 Because so much online activity involves elements that are not unambiguously speech-related,
whether such activities are in fact speech should be a subject of express
inquiry. The Court has made clear that conduct is not automatically
protected simply because it involves language in some way: “it has
never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.”96
And even when dealing with actions sufficiently expressive to be
considered speech for First Amendment purposes,97 “[t]he government
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has
in restricting the written or spoken word.” 98 When considering such
conduct as wearing of black armbands,99 setting fire to the American
flag, 100 making financial contributions to political campaigns, 101 or
burning draft cards,102 the Court asks whether such acts are speech at
all before turning to the question of how much, if at all, they are protected by the First Amendment.
But the conflation of Section 230 and the First Amendment shortcircuits this inquiry. Intermediaries invoking Section 230’s protections
implicitly characterize the acts or omissions at issue as speech, and
courts frequently allow them to do so without challenge. When “courts
routinely interpret Section 230 to immunize all claims based on thirdparty content”—including civil rights violations; “negligence; deceptive
trade practices, unfair competition, and false advertising; the common
law privacy torts; tortious interference with contract or business relations; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and dozens of other
legal doctrines”103—they go far beyond existing First Amendment doctrine, and grant online intermediaries an unearned advantage over offline intermediaries.104
95

See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1.
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
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See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (wearing
of black armbands conveyed message regarding a matter of public concern).
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See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376–77 (1968).
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Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
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Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
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Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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O’Brien, 391 U.S. 467.
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See Goldman, supra note 86, at 6.
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See Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, supra note 37, at 28; see also Citron, Section 230’s
Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, supra note 31 (arguing that claims about platforms’
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In addition to short-circuiting the analysis of whether particular
online activities qualify as speech at all, an overly indulgent view of
Section 230 short-circuits the analysis of whether and how much certain speech should be protected. The Court has repeatedly observed
that not all speech receives full protection under the First Amendment.105 Speech on “matters of public concern” is “‘at the heart of the
First Amendment’s protection,’” whereas “speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”106 Some categories
of speech, including obscenity, fighting words, and incitement, are historical exceptions to the First Amendment’s protections.107
Treating all online speech as presumptively protected not only ignores the nuances of First Amendment jurisprudence, but also elides
the varying reasons why certain speech is viewed as distinctly important in our system of free expression.108 Some speech matters for
self-expression, but not all speech does.109 Some speech is important for
the search for truth or for self-governance, but not all speech serves
those values. Also, as Kenneth Abraham and Edward White argue, the
“all speech is free speech” view devalues the special cultural and social
salience of speech about matters of public concern.110 It disregards the
fact that speech about private individuals about purely private matters
may not remotely implicate free speech values at all.
The view that presumes all online activity is normatively significant free expression protected by the First Amendment reflects what
Leslie Kendrick describes as “First Amendment expansionism”—
“where the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to encompass
ever more areas of law.”111 As Kendrick observes, the temptations of
First Amendment expansionism are heightened “in an information
economy where many activities and products involve communication.”112 The debate over Section 230 bears this out.
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See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (noting the existence of “welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
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Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
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U.S. v Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010), superseded by statute, 48 U.S.C. § 48 (2012).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, First Amendment Imperialism and the Constitutionalization of Tort Liability, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming).
111
See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200
(2015) (explaining that freedom of speech is a “term of art that does not refer to all speech activities, but rather designates some area of activity that society takes, for some reason, to have special
importance”).
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The indulgent approach to Section 230 veers far away not only from
the public discourse values at the core of the First Amendment, but also
from the original intentions of Section 230’s sponsors. Christopher Cox,
a former Republican Congressman who co-sponsored Section 230, has
been openly critical of “how many Section 230 rulings have cited other
rulings instead of the actual statute, stretching the law,” asserting that
“websites that are ‘involved in soliciting’ unlawful materials or ‘connected to unlawful activity should not be immune under Section
230.’” 113 The Democratic co-sponsor of Section 230, now-Senator Ron
Wyden, has similarly emphasized that he “wanted to guarantee that
bad actors would still be subject to federal law. Whether the criminals
were operating on a street corner or online wasn’t going to make a difference.”114
There is no justification for treating the internet as a magical
speech conversion machine: if the conduct would not be speech protected by the First Amendment if it occurs offline, it should not be transformed into speech merely because it occurs online. Even content that
unquestionably qualifies as speech should not be presumed to be doctrinally or normatively protected. Intermediaries seeking to take advantage of Section 230’s protections — given that those protections were
intended to foster free speech values — should have to demonstrate, rather than merely tacitly assert, that the content at issue is in fact
speech, and further that it is speech protected by the First Amendment.
B. Neutrality and the State Action Doctrine
The conflation of the First Amendment and Section 230, and internet activity with speech, contributes to another common misconception
about the law, which is that it requires tech companies to act as “neutral
public forums” in order to receive the benefit of immunity. Stated
slightly differently, the claim here is that tech companies receive Section 230’s legal shield only if they refrain — as the First Amendment
generally requires the government to refrain — from viewpoint discrimination. On this view, a platform’s removal, blocking, or muting of usergenerated content based on viewpoint amounts to impermissible censorship under the First Amendment that should deprive the platform
of its statutory protection against liability.115
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See Selyukh, supra note 5.
See Ron Wyden, Floor Remarks: CDA 230 and SESTA, MEDIUM (Mar. 21, 2018), https://med
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This misconception is twofold. First, there is nothing in the legislative history or text of Section 230 that supports such an interpretation.116 Not only does Section 230 not require platforms to act neutrally
vis-à-vis political viewpoints as state actors should, it urges exactly the
opposite. Under Section 230(b)(4), one of the statute’s policy goals includes “remov[ing] disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies.”117
Second, the “neutral platform” myth completely ignores the state
action doctrine, which provides that obligations created by the First
Amendment fall only upon government actors, not private actors. Attempting to extend First Amendment obligations to private actors is not
only constitutionally incoherent but endangers the First Amendment
rights of private actors against compelled speech.118
High-profile examples of the “neutral platform” argument include
Senator Ted Cruz, who has argued that “big tech enjoys an immunity
from liability on the assumption they would be neutral and fair. If
they’re not going to be neutral and fair, if they’re going to be biased, we
should repeal the immunity from liability so they should be liable like
the rest of us.”119 Representative Greg Gianforte denounced Facebook’s
refusal to run a gun manufacturer’s ads as blatant “censorship of conservative views.”120 Along these lines, Representative Louie Gohmert
contended that, “Instead of acting like the neutral platforms they claim
to be in order obtain their immunity,” social media companies “act like
a biased medium and publish their own agendas to the detriment of
others.”121
116

See David Ingram & Jane C. Timm, Why Republicans (and Even a Couple of Democrats)
Want to Throw Out Tech’s Favorite Law, NBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/po
litics/congress/why-republicans-even-couple-democrats-want-throw-out-tech-s-n1043346
[https://perma.cc/5UFA-FATJ] (highlighting that Rep. Cox recently underscored the fact that, “nowhere, nowhere, nowhere does the law say anything about [neutrality]”).
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See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see Manhattan
Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
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See Cale G. Weisman, Ted Cruz made it clear he supports repealing tech platforms’ safe
harbor, FAST CO. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90252598/ted-cruz-made-it-clearhe-supports-repealing-tech-platforms-safe-harbor [https://perma.cc/X3AU-MAMC]; see also Mike
Masnick, Senator Mark Warner Repeats Senator Ted Cruz’s Mythical, Made Up, Incorrect Claims
About Section 230, TECHDIRT (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190929/0017144
3090/senator-mark-warner-repeats-senator-ted-cruzs-mythical-made-up-incorrect-claims-aboutsection-230.shtml [https://perma.cc/5X2X-CVVT] (explaining that Democratic Senators have also
reinforced this myth. For instance, Senator Mark Warner claimed that “there was a decision made
that social media companies, and their connections, were going to be viewed as kind of just dumb
pipes, not unlike a telco”).
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See Internet and Consumer Protection, C-SPAN (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/vide
o/?465331-1/google-reddit-officials-testify-internet-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc/8YMETN4G].
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It is not just politicians who have fallen under the spell of the viewpoint neutrality myth. The Daily Wire’s former Editor-at-Large, Josh
Hammer, tweeted: “It is not government overreach to demand that Silicon Valley tech giants disclose their censorship algorithms in exchange
for continuing to receive CDA Sec. 230 immunity.”122
Several legislative and executive proposals endeavor to reset Section 230 to incentivize platforms to act as quasi-governmental actors
with a commitment to supposed viewpoint neutrality. One example is
Senator Josh Hawley’s bill, “Ending Support for Internet Censorship
Act.”123 Under the Hawley proposal, Section 230’s legal shield would be
conditioned on companies of a certain size obtaining FTC certification
of their “political neutrality.” Under Representative Gohmert’s proposal, Section 230 immunity would be conditioned on a platform’s posting of user-generated content in chronological order. Making judgments
about—in other words, moderating—content’s prominence and visibility would mean the loss of the legal shield.124 President Trump’s May
28, 2020 “Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship,” issued
after Twitter took the unprecedented step of fact-checking two Trump
tweets containing false information about mail-in ballots and marking
them as factually unsupported, sounded a similar theme, declaring that
Section 230 “immunity should not extend beyond its text and purpose
to provide protection for those who purport to provide users a forum for
free and open speech, but in reality use their power over a vital means
of communication to engage in deceptive or pretextual actions stifling
free and open debate by censoring certain viewpoints.”125
It is important to note, first, that there is no empirical basis for the
claim that conservative viewpoints are being suppressed on social media. In fact, there is weighty evidence indicating that rightwing content
dominates social media. Facebook, responding to concerns about anticonservative bias, hired former Senator John Kyl and lawyers at Covington & Burling to conduct an independent audit of potential anti-conservative bias.126 The Covington Interim Report did not conclude that
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political discourse”).
124
See Gohmert, supra note 121.
125
Exec. Order. No. 13925, 85 F.R. 34079 (2020).
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See Senator Jon Kyl, Covington Interim Report, COVINGTON INTERIM REPORT (Accessed
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Facebook had anti-conservative bias. 127 As Siva Vaidhyanathan observes, there is no evidence supporting accusations that social media
companies are disproportionately silencing conservative speech: the
complaints are “simply false.” 128 Many studies have found that conservative political campaigns have in fact leveraged social media to
much greater advantage than their adversaries.129
But even if the claims of anti-conservative bias on platforms did
have some basis in reality, the “neutral platform” interpretation of Section 230 takes two forms that actually serve to undermine, not promote,
First Amendment values. The first involves the conflation of private
companies with state actors, while the second characterizes social media platforms as public forums. Tech companies are not governmental
or quasi-governmental entities, and social media companies and most
online service providers are not publicly owned or operated.130 Both of
these forms of misidentification ignore private actors’ own First Amendment rights to decide what content they wish to endorse or promote.
Neither Section 230 nor any judicial doctrine equates “interactive
computer services” with state guarantors of First Amendment protections. As private actors, social media companies are no more required
to uphold the First Amendment rights of their users than would be
bookstores or restaurants to their patrons.131 As Eugene Kontorovich
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing on “Stifling
Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse”:
If tech platforms “engage in politically biased content-sorting . . . it is not a First Amendment issue. The First Amendment
only applies to censorship by the government. . . . The conduct of
private actors is entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment. If anything, ideological content restrictions are editorial
decisions that would be protected by the First Amendment. Nor
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can one say that the alleged actions of large tech companies implicate ‘First Amendment values,’ or inhibits the marketplace of
ideas in ways analogous to those the First Amendment seeks to
protect against.”132
The alternative argument attempts to treat social media platforms as
traditional public forums like parks, streets, or sidewalks. The public
forum has a distinct purpose and significance in our constitutional order. The public forum is owned by the public and operated for the benefit of all.133 The public’s access to public parks, streets, and sidewalks
is a matter of constitutional right.134 The public forum doctrine is premised on the notion that parks, streets, and sidewalks have been open for
speech “immemorially . . . time out of mind.”135 For that reason, denying access to public parks, streets, and sidewalks on the basis of the
content or viewpoint of speech is presumptively unconstitutional.136 But
wholly privately-owned social media platforms have never been designated as “neutral public forums.”137
As one of us (Franks) has written, the attempt to turn social media
controversies into debates over the First Amendment is an yet another
example of what Frederick Schauer describes as “the First Amendment’s cultural magnetism.”138 It suggests that “because private companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have become ‘state like’ in
many ways, even exerting more influence in some ways than the government, they should be understood as having First Amendment obligations, even if the First Amendment’s actual text or existing doctrine
would not support it.”139 Under this view, the First Amendment should
be expanded beyond its current borders.
But the erosion of the state action doctrine would actually undermine First Amendment rights, by depriving private actors of “a robust
sphere of individual liberty,” as Justice Kavanaugh recently expressed
132

See Hearing on Stifling Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse
Before S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th Congress (2019) (statement of Eugene Kontorovich, Prof.
Geo. Mason Law Sch.) (available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kontorovich
%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ8S-8SHV]).
133
See Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You
Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1360 (2018).
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Id.
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See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
137
See Padhi, supra note 115.
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See Mary Anne Franks, The Free Speech Black Hole: Can the Internet Escape the Gravitational Pull of the First Amendment?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knight
columbia.org/content/the-free-speech-black-hole-can-the-internet-escape-the-gravitational-pullof-the-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/8MGE-M8G3].
139
See id.; Citron & Richards, supra note 133, at 1371.
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it in Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck.140 An essential part of
the right to free speech is the right to choose what to say, when to say
it, and to whom. Indeed, the right not to speak is a fundamental aspect
of the First Amendment’s protections. As the Court famously held in
West Virginia v. Barnette, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”141
If platforms are treated as governmental actors or their services
deemed public fora, then they could not act as “Good Samaritans” to
block online abuse. This result would directly contravene the will of Section 230’s drafters.142 For instance, social media companies could not
combat spam, doxing, nonconsensual pornography, or deepfakes. 143
They could not prohibit activity that chases people offline. In our view,
it is desirable for platforms to address online abuse that imperils people’s ability to enjoy life’s crucial opportunities, including the ability to
engage with others online.
At the same time, the power that social media companies and other
platforms have over digital expression should not proceed unchecked,
as it does now in some respects. Currently, Section 230(c)(1)—the provision related to under-filtering content—shields companies from liability without any limit or condition, unlike Section 230(c)(2) which conditions the immunity for under-filtering on a showing of “good faith.”144
In Part IV, we offer legislative reforms that would check that power
afforded platforms. The legal shield should be cabined to interactive
computer services that wield their content-moderation powers responsibly, as the drafters of Section 230 wanted.145
140

See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1928.
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
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Citron & Richards, supra note 133, at 1371.
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In connection with our work with CCRI, we have helped tech companies do precisely that.
See generally Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 80; Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from
the Front Lines, supra note 61.
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47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
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See Citron & Richards, supra note 133, at 1374 (explaining that, of course, not all companies
involved in providing our online experiences are alike in their power and privilege. “As a company’s
power over digital expression grows closer to total (meaning there are few to no alternatives to
express oneself online), the greater the responsibilities (via regulation) attendant to that power.”
Companies running the physical infrastructure of the internet, such as internet service and broadband providers, have power over digital expression tantamount to governmental power. In locations where people only have one broadband provider in their area, being banned from that provider would mean no broadband internet access at all. The (now-abandoned) net neutrality rules
were animated by precisely those concerns); see also Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t Analogies but the Analogies that Courts Use, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/problem-isnt-use-analogies-analogies-courts-use
[https://perma.cc/6H7ZXPNN]; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2014) (arguing that the power of search engines may warrant far more regulation than currently exists. Although social media companies
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We would lose much and gain little if Section 230 were replaced
with the Hawley or Gohmert proposals, or if Trump’s Executive Order
were given practical effect.146 Section 230 already has a mechanism to
address the unwarranted silencing of viewpoints. 147 Under Section
230(c)(2), users or providers of interactive computer services enjoy immunity from liability for over-filtering or over-blocking speech only if
they acted in “good faith.” Under current law, platforms could face liability for removing or blocking content without “good faith” justification,
if a theory of relief exists on which they can be sued.148
C.

The Myth that Any Change to Section 230 Would Destroy Free
Speech

Another myth is that any Section 230 reform would jeopardize free
speech in a larger sense, even if not strictly in the sense of violating the
First Amendment. Of course, free speech is a cultural as well as a constitutional matter. It is shaped by non-legal as well as legal norms, and
tech companies play an outsized role in establishing those norms. We
agree that there is good reason to be concerned about the influence of
tech companies and other powerful private actors over the ability of individuals to express themselves. This is an observation we have been
making for years—that some of the most serious threats to free speech
come not from the government, but from non-state actors.149 Marginalized groups in particular, including women and racial minorities, have
long battled with private censorial forces as well as governmental ones.
But the unregulated internet — or rather, the selectively regulated internet — is exacerbating, not ameliorating, this problem. The current
state of Section 230 may ensure free speech for the privileged few; protecting free speech for all requires reform.
The concept of “cyber civil rights”150 speaks precisely to the reality
that the internet has rolled back many gains made for racial and gender
are powerful, they do not have the kind of control over our online experiences as broadband providers or even search engines do. Users banned on Facebook could recreate a social network elsewhere, though it would be time consuming and likely incomplete); Citron & Richards, supra note
133, at 1374 (highlighting that dissatisfaction with Facebook has inspired people’s migration to
upstart social network services like MeWe by exploring different non-constitutional ways that law
can protect digital expression).
146
See Mary Anne Franks, The Utter Incoherence of Trump’s Battle with Twitter, THE
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/the-utter-incoheren
ce-of-trumps-battle-with-twitter/612367/ [https://perma.cc/5UNZ-4WPR].
147 One of us (Franks) is skeptical of the argument that there is any legal theory that entitles people,
especially government officials, to demand access or amplification to a private platform.
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At the symposium, Brian Leiter provided helpful comments on this point.
See, e.g., MARY ANNE FRANKS, BEYOND ‘FREE SPEECH FOR THE WHITE MAN’: FEMINISM AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (2019); CITRON, HATE
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1.
150
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equality. The anonymity, amplification, and aggregation possibilities
offered by the internet have allowed private actors to discriminate, harass, and threaten vulnerable groups on a massive scale.151 There is empirical evidence showing that the internet has been used to further chill
the intimate, artistic, and professional expression of individuals whose
rights were already under assault offline.152
Even as the internet has multiplied the possibilities of expression,
it has multiplied the possibilities of repression. 153 The new forms of
communication offered by the internet have been used to unleash a regressive and censorious backlash against women, racial minorities, and
sexual minorities. The internet lowers the costs of engaging in abuse by
providing abusers with anonymity and social validation, while providing new ways to increase the range and impact of that abuse. The online
abuse of women in particular amplifies sexist stereotyping and discrimination, compromising gender equality online and off.154
The reality of unequal free speech rights demonstrates how regulation can, when done carefully and well, enhance and diversify speech
rather than chill it. According to a 2017 study, regulating online abuse
“may actually facilitate and encourage more speech, expression, and
sharing by those who are most often the targets of online harassment:
women.” 155 The study’s author suggests that when women “feel less
likely to be attacked or harassed,” they become more “willing to share,
speak, and engage online.” Knowing that there are laws criminalizing
online harassment and stalking “may actually lead to more speech, expression, and sharing online among adult women online, not less.” As
expressed in the title of a recent article by one of us (Citron) and Jonathon Penney, sometimes “law frees us to speak.”156

Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in the Time of COVID-19, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://
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MOVING BEYOND THE MYTHS: A MENU OF POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS

Having addressed misconceptions about the relationship between
Section 230 and the First Amendment, state and private actors, and
regulation and free speech outcomes, we turn to reform proposals that
address the problems that actually exist and are legitimately concerning. This Part explores different possibilities for fixing the overbroad
interpretation of Section 230.
A. Against Carveouts
Some reformers urge Congress to maintain Section 230’s immunity
but to create an explicit exception from its legal shield for certain types
of behavior. A recent example of that approach is the Stop Enabling Sex
Traffickers Act (SESTA),157 which passed by an overwhelming vote in
2016. The bill amended Section 230 by rendering websites liable for
knowingly hosting sex trafficking content.158
That law, however, is flawed. By effectively pinning the legal shield
on a platform’s lack of knowledge of sex trafficking, the law arguably
reprises the dilemma that led Congress to pass Section 230 in the first
place. To avoid liability, some platforms have resorted to either filtering
everything related to sex or sitting on their hands so they cannot be said
to have knowingly facilitated sex trafficking.159 That is the opposite of
what the drafters of Section 230 claimed to want—responsible content
moderation practices.
While we sympathize with the impulse to address particularly
egregious harms, the best way to reform Section 230 is not through a
piecemeal approach. The carveout approach is inevitably underinclusive, establishing a normative hierarchy of harms that leaves other
harmful conduct to be addressed another day. Such an approach would
require Section 230’s exceptions to be regularly updated, an impractical
option given the slow pace of congressional efforts and partisan deadlock.160
B. A Modest Proposal—Speech, Not Content
In light of the observations made in Part II.A., one simple reform
of Section 230 would be to make explicitly clear that the statute’s protections only apply to speech. The statutory fix is simple: replace the
157
158
159
160

Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017).
See id.
See Citron & Jurecic, supra note 12.
See Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, supra note 31.
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word “information” in (c)(1) with the word “speech.” Thus, that section
of the statute would read:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker: No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any speech provided by another information content
provider.
This revision would put all parties in a Section 230 case on notice that
the classification of content as speech is not a given, but a fact to be
demonstrated. If a platform cannot make a showing that the content or
information at issue is speech, then it should not be able to take advantage of Section 230 immunity.
C. Excluding Bad Samaritans
Another effective and modest adjustment would involve amending
Section 230 to exclude bad actors from its legal shield. There are a few
ways to do this. One possibility would be to deny the immunity to online
service providers that “deliberately leave up unambiguously unlawful
content that clearly creates a serious harm to others.”161 Another would
be to exclude from the immunity “the very worst actors:” sites encouraging illegality or that principally host illegality. 162 Yet another approach would be to exclude intermediaries who exhibit deliberate indifference to unlawful content or conduct.
A variant on this theme would deny the legal shield to cases involving platforms that have solicited or induced unlawful content. This approach takes a page from intermediary liability rules in trademark and
copyright law. As Stacey Dogan observed in that context, inducement
doctrines allow courts to target bad actors whose business models center on infringement.163 Providers that solicit or induce unlawful content
should not enjoy immunity from liability. This approach targets the
harmful activity while providing breathing space for protected expression.164
A version of this approach is embraced in the SHIELD Act of
2019,165 which one of us (Franks) assisted in drafting and the other (Citron) supported in advising lawmakers on behalf of the Cyber Civil
161
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Rights Initiative. Because SHIELD is a federal criminal bill, Section
230 could not be invoked to defend violations of it. However, the proposed bill creates a separate liability standard for providers of communications services that effectively grants them Section 230 immunity so
long as the provider does not intentionally solicit, or knowingly and predominantly distribute, content that the provider actually knows is in
violation of the statute.166
D. Conditioning the Legal Shield on Reasonable Content Moderation
There is a broader legislative fix that Benjamin Wittes and one of
us (Citron) have proposed. Under that proposal, platforms would enjoy
immunity from liability if they could show that their content-moderation practices writ large are reasonable. The revision to Section
230(c)(1) would read as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes
reasonable steps to address unlawful uses of its service that
clearly create serious harm to others shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider in any action arising out of the publication of content provided by that information content provider.
If adopted, the question before the courts in a motion to dismiss on Section 230 grounds would be whether a defendant employed reasonable
content moderation practices in the face of unlawful activity that manifestly causes harm to individuals. The question would not be whether
a platform acted reasonably with regard to a specific use of the service.
Instead, the court would ask whether the provider or user of a service
engaged in reasonable content moderation practices writ large with regard to unlawful uses that create serious harm to others.167
Congressman Devin Nunes has argued that reasonableness is a
vague and unworkable policy, 168 while Eric Goldman considers the
166
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proposal a “radical change that would destroy Section 230.” In Goldman’s estimation, “such amorphous eligibility standards” makes “Section 230 litigation far less predictable, and it would require expensive
and lengthy factual inquiries into all evidence probative of the reasonableness of defendant’s behavior.”169
Yes, a reasonableness standard would require evidence of a site’s
content moderation practices. But impossibly vague or amorphous it is
not. Courts have assessed the reasonableness of practices in varied
fields, from tort law to the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures.170 In a wide variety of contexts, the judiciary has
invested the concept of reasonableness with meaning.171 As John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have argued, tort law sets norms of behavior in recognizing wrongful, injury-inflicting conduct, and it empowers
victims to seek redress.172
Courts are well suited to address the reasonableness of a platform’s
speech policies and practices vis-à-vis particular forms of illegality that
cause clear harm to others (at the heart of a litigant’s claims). The reasonableness inquiry would begin with the alleged wrongdoing and liability. To state the obvious, platforms are not strictly liable for all content posted on their sites. Plaintiffs need a cognizable theory of relief to
assert against content platforms. Section 230’s legal shield would turn
on whether the defendant employed reasonable content moderation
practices to deal with the specific kind of harmful illegality alleged in
the suit.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to reasonable content moderation. Reasonableness would be tailored to the harmful conduct alleged
in the case. A reasonable approach to sexual-privacy invasions would
be different from a reasonable approach to spam or fraud. The question
would then be whether the online platform—given its size, user base,
and volume—adopted reasonable content moderation practices vis-à-vis
the specific illegality in the case. Did the platform have clear rules and
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 PENN. L. REV. 2131,
2135 (2015) (“For a term or a phrase to fall short of clarity because of vagueness is quite different
from having no meaning at all, and both are different from having multiple meanings—being ambiguous.”).
169
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See Zipursky, supra note 168, at 2135 (noting that reasonableness is the hallmark of negligence claims by stating that “[t]he range of uses of ‘reasonableness’ in law is so great that a list is
not an efficient way to describe and demarcate it”).
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This is not to suggest that all uses of the concept of reasonableness are sound or advisable.
There is a considerable literature criticizing various features of reasonableness inquiries. In this
piece, we endeavor to tackle the most salient critiques of reasonableness in the context of content
moderation practices.
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and Zipursky contend that tort law is not about setting prices for certain activity or allocating costs
to cheapest cost avoider. Id. at 46–47.
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a process to deal with complaints about illegal activity? What did that
process entail? The assessment of reasonable content-moderation practices would take into account differences among content platforms. A
blog with a few postings a day and a handful of commenters is in a different position than a social network with millions of postings a day.
The social network could not plausibly respond to complaints of abuse
immediately, let alone within a day or two, whereas the blog could. On
the other hand, the social network and the blog could deploy technologies to detect and filter content that they previously determined was
unlawful.173
Suppose a porn site is sued for public disclosure of private facts and
negligent enablement of a crime. The defendant’s site, which hosts hundreds of thousands of videos, encourages users to post porn videos. The
defendant’s terms of service (TOS) ban nonconsensual pornography and
doxing (the posting of someone’s contact information). In the complaint,
the plaintiff alleges that her nude photo and home address were posted
on the defendant’s site without her consent. Following this disclosure,
strangers came to the plaintiff’s house at night demanding sex. One of
those strangers broke into her house. Although the plaintiff immediately reported the post as a TOS violation, defendant did nothing for
three weeks.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on Section 230 grounds.
It submits evidence showing that it has a clear policy against nonconsensual pornography and a process to report abuse. Defendant acknowledges that its moderators did not act quickly enough in plaintiff’s case,
but maintains that generally speaking its practices satisfy the reasonableness inquiry. However, defendant offers no evidence showing its engagement in any content moderation at all.
Is there sufficient evidence that the defendant engaged in reasonable content moderation practices so that the court can dismiss the case
against it? Likely no. Yes, the defendant has clearly stated standards
notifying users that it bans nonconsensual pornography. And yet the
site has provided no proof that it has a systematic process to consider
complaints about such illegality. 174 In assessing reasonableness, it
would matter to the court that the site has thousands of videos to moderate. The volume of the content is relevant to the likelihood of potential
harm and the requirements to address such harm. The absence of a
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systematic process to respond to complaints of nonconsensual pornography shows the absence of reasonableness in the site’s practices writ
large.175
A reasonableness standard would not “effectively ‘lock in’ certain
approaches, even if they are not the best or don’t apply appropriately to
other forms of content,” as critics suggest.176 The promise of a reasonableness approach is its elasticity. As technology and content moderation
practices changes, so will the reasonableness of practices. As new kinds
of harmful online activity emerge so will the strategies for addressing
them. At the same time, a reasonableness approach would pave the way
for the development of norms around content moderation practices,
such as having clear policies in place, accessible reporting systems, and
content moderation practices tailored to particular forms of illegality.
A reasonable standard of care will reduce opportunities for abuse
without discouraging further development of a vibrant internet or turning innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for those injured
through their sites. Approaching the problem of addressing online
abuse by setting an appropriate standard of care readily allows differentiation among different kinds of online actors. Websites that solicit
illegality or that refuse to address unlawful activity that clearly creates
serious harm should not enjoy immunity from liability. On the other
hand, platforms that have safety and speech policies that are transparent and reasonably executed at scale should enjoy the immunity from
liability as the drafters of Section 230 intended.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reforming Section 230 is long overdue. With Section 230, Congress
sought to provide incentives for “Good Samaritans” to engage in efforts
to moderate content. That goal was laudable. But market pressures and
morals are not always enough, and they should not have to be.
A crucial component in any reform project is clear-eyed thinking.
And yet clear-eyed thinking about the internet is often difficult. The
Section 230 debate is, like many other tech policy reform projects, beset
by misconceptions. We have taken this opportunity to dispel myths
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around Section 230 so that this reform moment, a long time coming and
anticipated, is not wasted or exploited.

